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YOU SNOOZE, YOU LOSE, AND YOUR CLIENT GETS A RETRIAL:
UNITED STATES v. RAGIN AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IN SLEEPING LAWYER CASES
KIMBERLY SACHS*
“[T]here is a time for many words and there is a time for sleep.”1
I.

SLEEP? THERE’S A NAP FOR THAT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
OF OVERWORKED AND OVERTIRED ATTORNEYS

THE

PROBLEM

Anyone who has ever contemplated an important life decision has
probably heard these five words: You should sleep on it.2 This is not just
an age-old adage.3 Sleep, like food and water, is one of life’s essentials;
the human brain and body rely on sleep to stay healthy and function
properly, and studies suggest sleep can improve an individual’s ability
to process information and make decisions.4 Today, however, more
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2011, University of Wisconsin-Madison. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
Andrea and Ira Sachs, my siblings, Melissa and Matthew Sachs, and my husband,
Ryan Sun, for their unrelenting love and support throughout my life and law
school career. I would also like to thank everyone on Villanova Law Review who
helped me throughout the writing process.
1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 153 (Charles W. Eliot ed., Samuel Henry
Butcher & Andrew Lang trans., P.F. Collier & Son Co. 1909).
2. See Sleep on It, FREE DICTIONARY, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/
sleep+onţ [https://perma.cc/JRH4-EVZP] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (explaining
meaning of “sleep on it” idiom). To “sleep on it” means “to wait before making an
important decision.” Id.
3. See Karen Erger, Sleepless in the Corner Office, 103 ILL. B.J 48, 48–49 (2015)
(discussing study that found sleeplessness can make individuals over-optimistic
when contemplating decisions); see also Sleep-Deprived People Make Risky Decisions
Based on Too Much Optimism, DUKE HEALTH (Mar. 8, 2011), https://corporate.duke
health.org/node/3318 [https://perma.cc/M7DH-GLAZ] (summarizing study that
found sleep deprivation diminishes sensitivity to negative consequences). In the
study, neuroscientists from two Duke University medical schools tested twenty-nine
healthy adults to learn how sleep deprivation affects decision-making. See id. The
study found “that a night of sleep deprivation leads to increased brain activity in
brain regions that assess positive outcomes, while at the same time, this deprivation
leads to decreased activation in the brain areas that process negative outcomes.”
Id.
4. See Why Is Sleep Important?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/
health/health-topics/topics/sdd/why [https://perma.cc/F3JN-HZHC] (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (providing summary of physical and mental benefits of good
night’s sleep and noting “[s]leep helps your brain work properly”); see also Brain
Basics: Understanding Sleep, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISEASE & STROKE, http://
www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/brain_basics/understanding_sleep.htm [https://
perma.cc/WW4F-VNBS] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (summarizing importance of
sleep and explaining sleep “gives the brain a chance to exercise important neuronal connections that might otherwise deteriorate from lack of activity”).
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than one-third of American adults suffer from chronic sleep deprivation.5
Lawyers in particular average less sleep than almost any other working
professionals.6 Round-the-clock working cultures have become the norm
in the legal industry.7 Civil attorneys are chasing endless to-do lists, billable hour minimums, and the dream of partnership, and they are sacrificing sleep to accomplish their goals.8 Public defenders are similarly
overworked.9 As a result, public defenders are tired, and they are catching
5. See Anna Almendrala, More Than a Third of Americans Don’t Get Enough Sleep,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2016, 4:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/americans-arent-getting-enough-sleep_us_56c61306e4b0b40245c9687b
[https://perma.cc/ZJ2G-5DEN] (summarizing sleep study conducted by center of
disease control, which concluded approximately 83.6 million U.S. adults suffer
from sleep deprivation); see also Yong Liu et al., Prevalence of Healthy Sleep Duration
Among Adults—United States, 2014, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 19,
2016), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6506a1.htm?s_cid=mm65
06a1_w [https://perma.cc/6BRH-FDZL] (noting adults should sleep at least seven
hours each night because short sleep duration can lead to physical and mental
health problems).
6. See Catherine Rampell, America’s 10 Most Sleep-Deprived Jobs, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
02/22/americas-10-most-sleep-deprived-jobs/?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/GYJ8-Y2A
5] (explaining law is second most sleep-deprived profession, with most lawyers
averaging just seven hours of sleep each night); see also Erger, supra note 3, at 49
(noting practice of law involves late nights and stating “[i]t is not [ ] easy to do
good legal work or give good advice when you are running at a steep sleep
deficit”).
7. See The Truth About the Billable Hour, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale
.edu/student-life/career-development/students/career-guides-advice/truth-aboutbillable-hour [https://perma.cc/5QN2-37H9] (last updated May 2016) (concluding lawyers must work from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. during week and from 9:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m. three Saturdays each month to hit billable hour minimums).
8. See Erger, supra note 3, at 48–49 (“For lawyers, the pressure to generate
billable hours creates added incentives to steal a few hours from their personal
‘sleep bank.’”); see also Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data
on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 172, 182–83 (2005)
(noting long-term effects of billable hour expectations and discussing attorney
work-life survey that found average lawyer sleeps less than five hours each night
and often feels stressed and fatigued); Stephen L. Carter, Big Law Associates Need a
Nap, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-03/big-law-associates-need-a-nap [https://perma.cc/9HW8-5VL2]
(explaining legal industry encourages overwork and long hours). These articles
suggest “Big Law” associates work long hours because they must meet billable hour
minimums. See id. (stating big firms require between 2,000 and 2,200 billable
hours each year).
9. See Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective
Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 436 (2004) (“Although there are many dedicated
and competent public defenders, they often face staggering case loads that prevent
them from devoting their best efforts to every client.”). Weaver indicates that most
public defenders are overworked and underpaid, and “[i]n some offices, the work
loads are crushing and prevent public defenders (even the many who are competent and dedicated) from providing quality representation.” See id. at 441; see also
Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 703 (2010) (noting public defenders have excessive
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up on lost sleep when they can, where they can.10
Recently, a new favorite nap spot has emerged: the courtroom.11
Drowsy defense attorneys are sleeping through trial, and their clients, who
are often facing prison or death sentences, are challenging their convictions on the ground that they have received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.12 Four federal circuit courts have
already addressed this “sleeping lawyer” issue.13 In March 2016, the
Fourth Circuit added its voice to the matter in United States v. Ragin.14
In Ragin, the Fourth Circuit considered whether an attorney who
sleeps through trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.15 The court relied on two landmark Supreme
Court decisions when making its decision: Strickland v. Washington16 and its
caseloads and often lack skill, knowledge, and time to provide adequate representation to their clients).
10. See, e.g., Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting courtappointed counsel clearly slept during defendant’s trial); see also Deborah L.
Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2004) (stating
“[c]ourts have upheld convictions where lawyers were on drugs, asleep, or parking
their cars during key parts of the prosecutors’ cases” (emphasis added) (citing
DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004))). But see Bright supra, note 9, at
703 (“[M]ost lawyers do not sleep during trial.”).
11. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 2011) (addressing sleeping
lawyer issue); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling on
habeas corpus claim in sleeping lawyer case); Tippins, 77 F.3d at 683 (addressing
sleeping lawyer issue); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834–35 (9th Cir. 1984)
(ruling on sleeping lawyer issue). These cases have become known as the “sleeping lawyer” cases. See Kristina G. Van Arsdel, Note, Burdine v. Johnson: The Fifth
Circuit Wakes up, but the Supreme Court Refuses to Put the Sleeping Attorney Standard to
Rest, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 835, 853–56 (2002) (referring to Tippins, Javor, and Burdine
as “sleeping attorney” cases); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1801 (2001) (“Instances of courtroom napping are sufficiently
common that an entire jurisprudence has developed to determine how much dozing is constitutionally permissible.”).
12. For an in-depth discussion of sleeping lawyer cases, see infra notes 60–87
and accompanying text.
13. See Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623, 626 (ruling on sleeping lawyer issue and concluding there is no Sixth Amendment violation unless attorney sleeps for substantial portion of time); see also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 341 (ruling Sixth Amendment
violation occurs when counsel is “repeatedly unconscious through not insubstantial portions” of trial); Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687 (concluding defendant suffers
prejudice when counsel is “repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in
which defendant’s interests were at stake”); Javor, 724 F.2d at 834 (holding attorney that sleeps through substantial portion of defendant’s trial does not provide
defendant with legal assistance guaranteed by Sixth Amendment).
14. 820 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2016).
15. See id. (noting sleeping lawyer problem was issue of first impression in
Fourth Circuit). The case was on appeal from the Western District of North Carolina. See id. at 609; see also generally Ragin v. United States, No. 3:10-cv-488-RJC,
2014 WL 4105898 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2014), vacated, Ragin, 820 F.3d at 624.
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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companion case United States v. Cronic.17 Under Strickland, a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant.18 In
most contexts, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice; however,
the Cronic Court recognized certain circumstances are presumptively prejudicial, such as when there is an actual or constructive denial of counsel at
a critical stage of trial.19 In Ragin, the Fourth Circuit reasoned a sleeping
lawyer is akin to no lawyer at all and concluded there is a presumption of
prejudice under Cronic when an attorney sleeps through a substantial portion of a defendant’s criminal trial.20
This Note suggests the “substantial portion rule” articulated by the
Fourth Circuit is a vague and imprecise standard for determining
prejudice in sleeping lawyer cases and argues for a clearer rule that finds a
presumption of prejudice when an attorney sleeps during a critical portion of trial.21 Part II provides background information regarding the
17. 466 U.S. 648 (1984); see also Ragin, 820 F.3d at 617–18 (discussing and
interpreting Supreme Court precedent). For an in-depth discussion of the Strickland and Cronic decisions, see infra notes 41–59 and accompanying text.
18. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (explaining two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims and stating test has both performance prong and prejudice
prong).
19. Compare id. at 693 (noting ineffective assistance of counsel test is subject to
requirement that “defendant affirmatively prove prejudice”), with Cronic, 466 U.S.
at 658 (finding certain situations trigger presumption of prejudice). The Cronic
Court stated that there are some “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. According to the Court in Cronic, there is a Sixth Amendment violation “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” See id. at 659.
20. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 619 (concluding that counsel who sleeps through
substantial portion of trial is presumptively prejudicial under Cronic). The Fourth
Circuit analogized Ragin’s navigating through trial with a sleeping attorney to a
gladiator arriving in the arena without the proper weapons. See id. at 624; see also
United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975) (“While
a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the
ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to
gladiators.”).
21. See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting word “substantial” is unhelpful because “[i]t can refer to the length of time counsel slept, or
the proportion of the proceedings missed, or the significance of those proceedings”). Indeed, the word substantial is susceptible to a variety of interpretations.
See Substantial, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/us/substantial [https://perma.cc/5WK9-75W9] (last visited Apr. 9,
2017) (“Of considerable importance, size, or worth.”); see also Substantial, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial [https://per
ma.cc/3GUP-F7G4] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017) (“[L]arge in amount, size, or number.”). The “critical stage rule” mirrors the language in Cronic. See Cronic, 466 U.S.
at 659 (concluding trial is unfair if defendant does not receive effective assistance
of counsel at critical stage of trial); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming
of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 878 (2004) (“Not even a substantial absence
satisfies [Cronic] unless it occurs during key moments of the trial.”); Matthew J.
Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth
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Sixth Amendment and effective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.22
Part III discusses the facts of Ragin and provides an analysis of the Ragin
court’s decision-making process.23 Part IV analyzes the Ragin court’s decision and disagrees with the Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the substantial
portion rule.24 Finally, Part V assesses the potential impact of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision.25
II.

THE DEFENSE RESTS: STRICKLAND, CRONIC,
AND SLEEPING LAWYER CASES

As lawyers continue to juggle heavy caseloads, reaching the recommended eight hours of sleep each night becomes increasingly more difficult for them.26 Sleep deprivation plagues the legal profession, and while
the physical price of insufficient sleep may be poor health, an attorney’s
lack of sleep raises substantive legal issues, as well.27 Indeed, courts have
been faced with deciding whether a sleeping lawyer constitutes an actual
or constructive denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution for over three decades.28 While each court has concluded that
Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 99 (2002)
(arguing courts should find per se prejudice when “counsel sleeps during a relatively large portion of the overall trial, during any substantial portion of the trial,
or during any critical stage of trial” (emphasis added)).
22. For a further discussion of the development of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and effective assistance of counsel, see infra notes 26–87 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the facts of Ragin, see infra notes 88–117 and
accompanying text. For a narrative analysis of the Ragin decision, see infra notes
118–44 and accompanying text.
24. For a critical analysis of the Ragin decision, see infra notes 145–83 and
accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the impact of the Ragin decision, see infra notes
184–90 and accompanying text.
26. See Rampell, supra note 6 (discussing study that concluded law is second
most sleep-deprived profession and noting lawyers get only seven hours of sleep
each night).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2016) (considering Sixth Amendment violation in sleeping lawyer case). Sixth Amendment
claims are not the only substantive legal issues that surround the sleeping lawyer; a
sleeping lawyer can also face legal malpractice claims. See Rebecca A. Copeland,
Toward a More Effective Standard of Review: The Potential Effect of Burdine v. Johnson
on Legal Malpractice in Texas, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 849, 852 (2002) (arguing court
finding that attorney slept through trial should “affect [a] criminal defendant’s
ability to prevail as a plaintiff in a legal malpractice civil action against [a] sleeping
attorney”).
28. See Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (addressing
sleeping lawyer claim). Javor was the first federal circuit court to address the sleeping lawyer issue. See id. (issuing decision same year as Strickland and Cronic opinions); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 425, 460 (1996) (characterizing Javor as pre-Strickland case). The most recent circuit court to rule on the issue was the Ragin court. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at
609 (issuing decision in March 2016).
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dozing defense attorneys violate the Sixth Amendment, the current rules
regarding courtroom catnaps are vague and vary from circuit to circuit.29
A.

It Is Not a Dream: You Have the Right to an Effective Attorney

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right to counsel.30 As early as 1932, the Supreme Court recognized the right to counsel as a fundamental right essential to fair
trials.31 Attorneys’ presence at trial is essential because “they are the
means through which the other rights of the person on trial are secured.”32 The average criminal defendant is unequipped with the skill
and knowledge necessary to prepare an adequate legal defense, and as a
result, attorneys are necessary to guide an accused through the judicial
process and protect the accused from a conviction.33
29. See Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 856 (explaining standards utilized to determine when sleeping attorney’s conduct is “so egregious” as to trigger presumption of prejudice differ from circuit to circuit).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 63, 65 (1932) (finding right to counsel
fundamental right and concluding denial of counsel would contravene due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment). In Powell, the defendants were charged
with rape, and no lawyer had been designated to represent the defendants until
the morning of trial. See id. at 58–60 (finding defendants did not have aid of counsel from time of arraignment until beginning of trial and stating attorney appearance at trial was “pro forma [rather] than zealous and active”). The Court
considered whether this denial of counsel violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 61. Answering affirmatively, the Court held a
denial of counsel would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, a denial of due
process “in the constitutional sense.” See id. at 69. The Court, however, expressly
limited its holding to the facts before it. See id. at 65 (choosing not to decide
whether denial of counsel violates due process clause in other criminal proceedings or under other circumstances). Still, the Court recognized that
[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law . . . . Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible . . . . He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Id. at 68–69.
32. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (discussing importance of attorneys).
33. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69 (noting defendants require guiding hand of
counsel because defendants are “unfamiliar with the rules of evidence” and “science of law”).
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As such, in Johnson v. Zerbst,34 the Supreme Court held that counsel
must be provided for defendants who cannot afford to hire their own attorneys in all federal criminal trials.35 The Supreme Court extended this
constitutional mandate to state criminal courts in Gideon v. Wainwright.36
Writing for the Gideon majority, Justice Black famously stated lawyers “are
necessities, not luxuries.”37
Mere appointment of counsel, however, does not in and of itself satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional guarantees.38 In order to
achieve the purpose of the Sixth Amendment—a fair trial—an attorney
must provide an accused with effective assistance of counsel.39 The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in essence, is the right to a reasonably competent attorney who advocates for the defendant and subjects the criminal
trial to “meaningful adversarial testing.”40
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland, all federal courts
of appeal assessed attorney performance using a “reasonably effective assistance” standard.41 However, each court applied different tests with re34. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
35. See id. at 467–68 (stating federal court must comply with Sixth Amendment when depriving defendant of life or liberty).
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court recognized the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment is a fair trial, and “[t]his noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor [defendants] charged with crime ha[ve] to face [their] accusers without a
lawyer to assist [them].” See id. at 344.
37. See id. (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” (emphasis
added)); see also Cronic, 466 U.S. at 653 (stating counsel’s presence at trial is essential because lawyers help secure rights of defendants).
38. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“That a person
who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is
not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.”). The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel envisions “counsel’s
playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results.” See id.; see also Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984)
(explaining mere physical presence of attorney in courtroom is insufficient to satisfy “the [S]ixth [A]mendment entitlement to the assistance of counsel” (citing
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978))).
39. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (recognizing
right to counsel as right to effective assistance of counsel); see also Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686 (stating purpose of Sixth Amendment is “to ensure a fair trial”).
40. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (“[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To satisfy the Constitution, counsel must function as an advocate for the
defendant, as opposed to a friend of the court.” (citing Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967))).
41. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683 (stating all federal courts of appeals have
adopted “reasonably effective assistance” standard). The “reasonably effective assistance” standard looks to see if an attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688 (“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”).
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spect to the prejudice a defendant had to show to succeed on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.42 For these reasons, in 1984, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Strickland to elaborate on the meaning of effective assistance of counsel.43
In Strickland, a defendant sentenced to death filed for a writ of habeas
corpus.44 The defendant claimed his counsel provided ineffective assistance during his criminal trial by failing to seek out evidence concerning
the defendant’s character and emotional state.45 The case eventually
For many years, there was sharp disagreement over what specifically constituted
“reasonably effective assistance of counsel,” and two opposing schools of thought
emerged: the categorical approach and the “judgmentalist” approach. See Martin
C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 419 (1988). “The
categorical approach proceeds from the basic premise that certain identifiable actions by counsel are essential to effective representation . . . . [and] failure or
inability to complete these [actions] . . . provides per se grounds for granting the
defendant relief.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 11.7(c) (1984)). In contrast, “judgmentalists” believe that “each trial
is different and that therefore ineffective assistance claims must be judged with
greater subjectivity and deference, on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (noting Justice
Brennan’s opinion in Strickland exemplifies judgmentalist approach because Brennan emphasized that particular set of rules would be inappropriate to accommodate variety of situations that give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
42. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684 (“With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the lower courts have
adopted tests that purport to differ in more than formulation.” (citing appellate
brief)).
43. See id. at 684, 686 (recognizing Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether “reasonably effective assistance” standard is proper standard by which to
address attorney performance and granting certiorari to examine meaning of effective assistance of counsel further).
44. See id. at 678 (stating defendant sought habeas relief). Prior to filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the defendant sought relief in
Florida state court. See id. at 677–78 (noting Florida state court denied relief to
defendant).
45. See id. (explaining defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). In
Strickland, the state of Florida appointed a criminal lawyer to represent a defendant
charged with planning and committing “three brutal stabbing murders.” See id. at
672 (discussing facts of case). The defendant, acting against counsel’s specific advice, confessed to two of the murders and waived his right to a jury trial. See id.
(describing defendant’s confession). In preparing for sentencing, counsel did not
seek character witnesses for the defendant nor request a psychiatric examination.
See id. at 673 (discussing lack of action by counsel). The decision to stop looking
for evidence concerning the defendant’s character and emotional state reflected
counsel’s “sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of [the
defendant’s] confessions to the gruesome crimes.” See id. (discussing reasoning of
decision). The trial judge sentenced the defendant to death, and the defendant
subsequently sought relief in state court on the ground that his attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing proceeding. See id. at 675 (noting procedural history). The state trial courts rejected the defendant’s petition.
See id. at 678 (noting Florida state courts concluded defendant was unable to make
out prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel). The defendant then filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Florida. See id.
(discussing defendant’s writ of habeas corpus). When the district court denied the
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reached the Supreme Court, where the Justices considered the proper
standard by which to assess an attorney’s performance.46
The Strickland majority held that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must make two showings.47 First, the defendant must
show that the attorney’s performance was deficient, and second, that this
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.48 The performance
prong requires a defendant to show that the counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable considering all of the circumstances.49 Additionpetition, the defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 679 (discussing
defendant’s appeal to Fifth Circuit). In reversing the lower court’s decision, the
Fifth Circuit developed its own standard for analyzing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 891 (5th Cir. 1982)
(discussing standard for assessing attorney performance in Fifth Circuit), rev’d on
reh’g, Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev’d
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701. The Fifth Circuit stated that the methodology for determining whether an attorney rendered reasonably effective assistance of counsel
“involves an inquiry into the actual performance of counsel conducting the defense and a determination of whether reasonably effective assistance was rendered
based on the totality of the circumstances.” See Strickland, 673 F.2d at 891 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 279 (5th
Cir. 1981)). The court then remanded the case and instructed the district court to
apply the newly-announced framework. See id. at 906 (remanding with instructions
to analyze case using standards developed and summarized in opinion). The government sought review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to elaborate on the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel and consider the proper standard by which to assess an attorney’s
performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (explaining Supreme Court has not
yet elaborated on effective assistance of counsel in cases presenting claims of “actual ineffectiveness”); see also id. (noting officials of state of Florida sought review
of lower court’s decision).
46. See id. at 684 (granting certiorari).
47. See id. at 687 (articulating two-part test).
48. See id. (explaining what defendant must show to satisfy Strickland test).
Before the Supreme Court began its discussion, it noted that “[t]he benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.” See id. at 686. Since 1984, the rigid
two-part test has been heavily criticized as creating “an almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance [of counsel].” See Calhoun supra
note 41, at 427 (criticizing two-part test). Calhoun argues that “the specific goals
of the Sixth Amendment would be better served if the Court . . . were to reverse
convictions without requiring a showing of prejudice.” Id. at 417. Calhoun urges
the Supreme Court to abolish the prejudice requirement, arguing the Strickland
“prejudice prong is in large measure responsible for transforming a standard
meant to protect the basic constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
into the proverbial ‘eye of the needle’ through which few defendants are able to
pass.” See id. at 455 (arguing for abolition of prejudice prong). At the time Calhoun’s article was written, “43.3% of all the unsuccessful ineffective assistance
claims brought under Strickland [had] been rejected solely for lack of prejudice.”
Id.
49. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (explaining performance prong of two-part
test). But see id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Is a ‘reasonably competent attorney’ a reasonably competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney?”). The Court noted that judicial scrutiny of an

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

436

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 427

ally, the defendant must show that counsel was not providing the legal
assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.50 Under the prejudice
prong, a defendant must show that the counsel’s errors deprived the defendant of a fair and reliable trial.51 The Strickland Court made it clear
that a defendant must prove both prongs in order to show there was “a
breakdown in the adversary process.”52
In most circumstances, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel must affirmatively prove prejudice under the Strickland test.53 To
prove prejudice adequately, the defendant must show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
trial would have been different.54 In some contexts, however, a case-bycase inquiry into prejudice is unnecessary; prejudice is presumed.55
Strickland and its companion case, Cronic, identified distinct situations
in which there is a presumption of prejudice, such as when there is state
interference with counsel’s assistance or when a lawyer is burdened by a
conflict of interest.56 Courts may also presume prejudice when there is a
attorney’s performance must be highly deferential. See id. at 689 (majority opinion) (stating courts should strongly presume that “counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”).
50. See id. at 687 (explaining first prong of test “requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”).
51. See id. (stating prejudice prong “requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable”). But see id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (objecting to prejudice standard and noting difficulties of estimating prejudice after trial’s conclusion). Marshall wrote that “a showing that the performance of a defendant’s lawyer departed
from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of
whether the defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby.” Id. at 712; see
also Jeffery Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 169 (2001) (agreeing with
Justice Marshall and stating “failure to provide effective assistance could constitute
an independent due process violation, with or without prejudice to the defendant”
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
52. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown
in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”).
53. See id. at 693 (explaining that defendant must show that attorney’s conduct had adverse effect on defense). The Court made it clear that a defendant
must prove prejudice, and a showing that an attorney’s performance was unreasonable or “had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding” is not
enough under the Strickland test. See id. But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 658–59 (1984) (describing circumstances that trigger presumption of
prejudice).
54. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (explaining that “reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”).
55. See id. at 692 (stating certain contexts trigger presumption of prejudice).
56. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 (“There are . . . circumstances that are so likely
to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is
unjustified.”). The Court continued:
Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a
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complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of trial.57 This occurs
when counsel is totally absent from trial or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceedings.58 Absent these limited
circumstances, the two-part Strickland test governs, and defendants have
the burden of proving that their counsel’s conduct affected the outcome
of the case.59
B.

In the Courtroom, the Mighty Courtroom, the Lawyer Sleeps Tonight:
Presuming Prejudice in Sleeping Lawyer Cases

Since Strickland, three circuits have addressed ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in sleeping lawyer cases.60 Each court recognized that a
trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.
Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that make the adversary process itself presumptively
unreliable . . . .
Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions
when although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the
likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.
Id. at 659–60 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Cronic errors are deemed to
be structural errors, which means they affect the reliability of the trial itself. See
United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Cronic errors are structural, requiring automatic reversal without any inquiry into the existence of actual
prejudice.” (citing several cases analyzing Cronic)).
57. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (noting certain circumstances warrant presumption of prejudice); see also Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“We conclude that the Sixth Amendment principle animating Cronic’s presumption of prejudice is the fundamental idea that a defendant must have the actual
assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding for the court’s
reliance on the fairness of that proceeding to be justified.”). The Supreme Court
has identified which stages of trial are critical. See id. at 347 (“[T]he presentation
of evidence against a defendant is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.” (citing
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977))); see also United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)) (suggesting proceeding is critical
when accused is confronted by expert adversary or legal procedural system and
“results of the confrontation ‘might well settle accused’s fate’” (quoting Wade, 388
U.S. at 224)). When deciding whether a particular stage of trial is “critical,” the
Supreme Court has looked to whether the “substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected” during that portion of the proceeding. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (finding presentation of defendant’s testimony and making of closing arguments to be
critical stages of trial).
58. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25 (explaining Supreme Court has “uniformly
found” Sixth Amendment violations without “showing of prejudice” when counsel
is absent or unable to assist defendant during critical portion of trial).
59. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 618 (discussing Strickland and Cronic and explaining
defendants must show prejudice under two-part Strickland test unless narrow circumstances articulated in Cronic are present).
60. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 2011) (addressing sleeping
lawyer claim); see also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338 (ruling on sleeping lawyer issue);

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5

438

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 427

sleeping attorney equates to no attorney at all and held there is a presumption of prejudice under Cronic when counsel sleeps during trial.61
However, the standards for when a sleeping attorney’s conduct triggers
this presumption vary from circuit to circuit.62
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision, the Ninth Circuit
decided a sleeping lawyer ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Javor v.
United States.63 Defendant Eddie G. Javor was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of the possession and sale of
heroin under federal law.64 Javor filed for a writ of habeas corpus from
prison, claiming he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment because his attorney slept during trial.65 The Ninth
Circuit agreed and concluded an attorney who sleeps through a substantial portion of trial is unable to provide a defendant with the legal assistance necessary to defend his or her interests.66
Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 683–84 (2d Cir. 1996) (addressing sleeping lawyer
issue).
61. See, e.g., Tippins, 77 F.3d at 685 (recognizing counsel was unconscious during trial and stating circumstance triggers presumption of prejudice).
62. Compare Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623 (adopting substantial portion rule), with
Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349, 364 (concluding attorney’s repeated unconsciousness
“‘through not insubstantial portions’ of trial” warrants presumption of prejudice).
See also Fogelman supra note 21, at 85 (recognizing disagreement among lower
courts regarding what standard to use when assessing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in sleeping lawyer cases); Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 856
(“[W]hat may be enough sleep at the right time to constitute presumed prejudice
for one court may not be adequate proof for another court.”).
63. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984).
64. See id. (discussing facts of case).
65. See id. (explaining Javor sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Section 2255 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). In relation to Javor’s habeas petition, the magistrate
judge held an evidentiary hearing and found Javor’s attorney was asleep during a
substantial part of the trial, particularly when evidence relevant to the prosecution
was being introduced and the participation of Javor’s counsel—“to observe witnesses, listen to testimony, consider the posing of objections, prepare cross-examination of witnesses, consider the preparation of rebuttal evidence, and prepare
argument on such evidence”—was proper. See Javor, 724 F.2d at 832. However,
the magistrate judge found Javor had failed to show that prejudice resulted from
the courtroom catnap. See id.
66. See id. at 834 (concluding substantial courtroom slumber is inherently
prejudicial because “unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at
all”). The Javor court emphasized that the defendant’s right to counsel “was violated not because of specific legal errors or omissions indicating incompetence,
but because he had no legal assistance during a substantial portion of his trial.” See
id. at 833–34.
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In 1996, the Second Circuit in Tippins v. Walker67 became the first
circuit to apply Strickland and Cronic in a sleeping lawyer case.68 After receiving an eighteen-year prison sentence, Dale Tippins filed a writ of
habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York, claiming his attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by sleeping during trial.69 Applying the Javor rule, the district court found Tippins’ attorney had slept
for a “substantial portion” of trial and granted the petition.70
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment
but articulated a new rule regarding presumptive prejudice in sleeping
lawyer cases.71 Finding the word substantial “unhelpful,” the court declined to adopt the “substantial portion” rule and instead held an attorney
deprives a defendant of effective assistance of counsel when the attorney is
“repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which the defendant’s interests were at stake.”72

67. 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
68. See id. at 685–87 (interpreting Supreme Court precedent).
69. See id. at 684. Tippins was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance and criminal possession of a controlled substance after purchasing two
pounds of cocaine from an undercover police officer in 1986. See id. at 683–84.
The State of New York appointed attorney Louis Tirelli to represent Tippins at
trial. See id. at 684. Tirelli mounted an entrapment defense, but the jury found
Tippins guilty and sentenced him to eighteen years to life in prison. See id. Tippins claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, but the New York Appellate Division
found Tirelli provided Tippins with a vigorous defense. See People v. Tippins, 173
A.D.2d 512, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel
claim to be without merit because counsel “vigorously cross-examined [ ] witnesses . . . delivered [adequate] opening and closing arguments . . . raised appropriate objections, [and] made appropriate motions” throughout trial), habeas
corpus granted, Tippins v. Walker, 889 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, Tippins, 77
F.3d at 683. After the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal and the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, Tippins sought relief in the Southern District of New York. See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 684.
70. See Tippins, 889 F. Supp. at 94 (“Accordingly, as the Second Circuit has
accepted Javor’s holding that sleeping counsel is tantamount to no counsel at all,
this Court holds that Tirelli’s sleeping constituted a per se violation of petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
71. See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 685 (agreeing with district court that evidence supports grant of writ but finding Javor rule unhelpful). Recognizing that
“[p]rolonged inattention during stretches of a long trial (by sleep . . . or otherwise), particularly during periods concerned with other defendants, uncontested
issues, or matters peripheral to a particular defendant, may be quantitatively substantial but without consequence,” the court articulated a rule that focused not
only on how long an attorney sleeps, but also on the portion of trial an attorney
sleeps through. See id. at 686–87 (concluding defendants suffer prejudice when
counsel is repeatedly unconscious for periods of time in which defendants’ interests are at stake).
72. See id. at 689–90 (applying this rule and finding Tirelli repeatedly slept for
several minutes during testimony of some witnesses). The court found that “those
witnesses included either the key prosecution witnesses or the witnesses Tippins
was calling in his own defense.” Id. at 689.
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Five years later, the sleeping lawyer issue reached the Fifth Circuit.73
In Burdine v. Johnson,74 the court considered whether Calvin Jerold Burdine’s state-appointed attorney violated Burdine’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by sleeping throughout the guilt-innocence phase of Burdine’s
trial.75 After a six-day trial in 1984, the jury found Burdine guilty of capital
murder and sentenced him to death.76
Burdine filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of
Texas, claiming his attorney’s sleeping at trial amounted to a constructive
denial of counsel.77 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated Burdine’s capital
murder conviction.78 In granting habeas corpus relief, the court ruled a
Sixth Amendment violation occurs when counsel is “repeatedly unconscious through not insubstantial portions” of trial.79
73. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing merits of Sixth Amendment claim where petitioner’s attorney slept during trial).
74. 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001).
75. See id. at 340 (noting state court findings show counsel repeatedly slept
when prosecutor was questioning witnesses and presenting evidence against
defendant).
76. See Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en
banc) (affirming conviction and death sentence related to defendant’s capital
murder charge), habeas corpus granted, Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854 (S.D.
Tex. 1999), vacated, 231 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d on reh’g, 262 F.3d at 350.
77. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 340 (discussing petitioner’s application for writ of
habeas corpus). Prior to filing for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Burdine petitioned the Texas state court for habeas relief. See id. at 339 (noting Burdine’s initial state application was denied). Although the state habeas court found
Burdine’s attorney slept through the guilt-innocence phase of Burdine’s trial, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Burdine’s petition. See id. at 340 (concluding Burdine did not discharge burden of proof required by Strickland). Burdine subsequently sought relief in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See
id. Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
....
(2) An application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits,
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust remedies available
in the courts of the State.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)–(b)(2) (2012). In reviewing Burdine’s petition, the district
court concluded that Burdine’s counsel’s unconsciousness amounted to a constructive denial of counsel and triggered a presumption of prejudice under Strickland and Cronic. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 340. The state appealed. See id. at 340–41
(noting state argued “the facts of Burdine’s case [did] not warrant a presumption
of prejudice because Burdine’s counsel slept during indeterminate periods of what
otherwise amounted to an adversarial trial”).
78. See id. at 350 (affirming district court’s grant of habeas relief and vacating
Burdine’s conviction and sentence).
79. See id. at 341, 349 (noting decision is limited to egregious facts of case and
refusing to adopt per se rule that “any dozing by defense counsel during trial merits a presumption of prejudice”).
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The Sixth Circuit chose not to adopt the Burdine standard when it
addressed the sleeping lawyer problem in Muniz v. Smith.80 Instead, the
court looked to the earlier Javor decision and held a sleeping attorney triggers a presumption of prejudice under Cronic only if the attorney sleeps
for a “substantial portion” of the trial.81 Applying this rule, the court
found defendant Joseph Arthur Muniz established that his attorney slept
only for an undetermined portion of a single cross-examination; this did
not satisfy the substantial portion standard.82 Therefore, the court analyzed Muniz’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim using the Strickland
two-part test.83
In sum, the rules used to determine prejudice in sleeping lawyer cases
vary from circuit to circuit, and since 1984, three main standards have
emerged.84 The Second Circuit presumes prejudice when an attorney is
“repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which the defendant’s interests were at stake.”85 In the Fifth Circuit, an attorney violates a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the attorney is “repeatedly unconscious through not insubstantial portions” of trial.86 Lastly, the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits presume prejudice when an attorney sleeps
through a “substantial portion” of a trial.87

80. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 2011) (ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel claim in sleeping lawyer case).
81. See id. at 623 (noting all federal circuits to consider sleeping lawyer issue
have, in some formulation or another, held there is presumption of prejudice
when counsel sleeps through substantial portion of trial).
82. See id. (concluding counsel’s mid-trial slumber did not rise to level of “substantial”). The Sixth Circuit found Muniz’s counsel did not sleep for the entire
cross-examination because the attorney raised some objections toward the end of
the questioning. See id. at 623–24. Given the cross-examination was fairly short—
only twenty-six pages of the entire trial transcript—the court concluded that
Muniz’s counsel must have only been asleep for a brief period of time. See id. at
624.
83. See id. (applying Strickland test and finding Muniz unable to satisfy
prejudice prong).
84. See Fogelman, supra note 21, at 85 (noting there is disagreement among
circuit courts regarding sleeping lawyer standards).
85. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (articulating rule and
stating Tippins’ claim of prejudice was not that “his lawyer should have taken any
particular initiative . . . but that, at critical times, Tippins had no counsel to sort
out what initiatives were open”).
86. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001) (articulating
rule and highlighting “fundamental unfairness in Burdine’s capital murder trial
created by the consistent unconsciousness of his counsel”).
87. See Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating substantial portion rule); see also Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623 (applying substantial portion
rule and finding defendant could not establish that counsel was asleep for substantial portion of trial).
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III. WAKE ME UP WHEN THE TRIAL ENDS: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CONSIDERS COURTROOM CATNAPS IN UNITED STATES V. RAGIN
In March 2016, the sleeping lawyer issue reached the Fourth Circuit
in Ragin.88 In Ragin, the court considered whether a dozing defense lawyer violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.89 Answering affirmatively, the Fourth Circuit followed the lead of
the Javor and Muniz courts and held there is a presumption of prejudice
under Cronic when an attorney sleeps through a substantial portion of a
defendant’s criminal trial.90
A.

Facts of United States v. Ragin

For almost three years in the early 2000s, Nicholas Ragin participated
in a prostitution and crack cocaine conspiracy in North Carolina.91
Ragin’s involvement with the conspiracy ended in 2004, when a grand jury
in the Western District of North Carolina returned a two-count indictment
charging Ragin with conspiracy to commit offenses against the United
States and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.92 Following the indictment, the district court appointed attorney Nikita V.
Mackey to represent Ragin.93
Ragin pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial, where he was one of
three defendants.94 The trial lasted eighteen days and included testimony
88. See United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2016) (addressing
sleeping lawyer issue).
89. See id. (“This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit:
whether a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when his
counsel sleeps during trial.”).
90. See id. at 619 (detailing when presumption of prejudice exists as result of
substantial portion rule).
91. See Ragin v. United States, No. 3:10-cv-488-RJC, 2014 WL 4105898, at *2
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (summarizing factual background of prostitution ring
and crack cocaine conspiracy), vacated, Ragin, 820 F.3d at 624. Ragin, as the “enforcer” for the conspiracy, allegedly beat women and used firearms to defend the
operations. See id. (describing Ragin’s role in conspiracy and explaining Ragin
would beat women for price, usually around $100). Witness testimony also revealed that Ragin would drive prostitutes to their “appointments,” and he helped
bag various drugs for the conspiracy. See id.
92. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 613 (stating grand jury convicted Ragin with conspiracy in violation of federal statutes). In particular, Ragin was alleged to have
violated 18 U.S.C. § 371, 21 U.S.C. § 841, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 21 U.S.C. § 861. See
id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (making conspiracy to commit offense or to
defraud United States unlawful); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful
to knowingly “manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012)
(criminalizing attempt and conspiracy); 21 U.S.C. § 861 (2012) (making it unlawful to employ or use persons under eighteen years old in drug operations).
93. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 613 (stating district court appointed Mackey as
counsel for Ragin).
94. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *1 (noting Ragin and six others were
charged with conspiracy). Three of Ragin’s co-defendants pleaded guilty, while
Ragin, Tracy Howard, David Howard, and Oscar Solano-Sanchez pleaded not
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from approximately forty witnesses, six of whom testified about Ragin’s
direct involvement in the drug and prostitution rings.95 At the conclusion
of trial, the jury found Ragin guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced Ragin to thirty years’ imprisonment.96 Ragin appealed the sentence, but it was affirmed.97
On October 1, 2010, Ragin filed a petition to have his conviction and
sentence vacated.98 Ragin argued that Mackey provided ineffective assistance of counsel by falling asleep during the trial.99 The district court
ordered an evidentiary hearing to resolve Ragin’s claim.100 At the hearing, Ragin called three witnesses, including Richard Culler and Peter
Adolf, the defense attorneys for Ragin’s two co-defendants, as well as
Pamela Vernon, a juror in the trial.101
First, Adolf testified that he saw Mackey sleeping at trial on one occasion.102 In particular, Adolf recalled that Mackey was unresponsive when
an attorney for the government approached Mackey to introduce a new
exhibit.103 Mackey did not move or say anything until the judge called
guilty. See id. (“Three co-defendants chose to plead guilty, while Ragin and three
co-defendants pleaded not guilty and were tried jointly by a jury in April 2006.”);
see also Ragin, 820 F.3d at 613 (indicating which co-defendants proceeded to trial
with Ragin).
95. See Ragin 820 F.3d at 613 (stating trial lasted from April 3 to April 21 and
noting six of forty witnesses testified about Ragin’s direct involvement in conspiracy while other witnesses testified about acts of Howard, Howard, and SolanoSanchez).
96. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *1 (noting Ragin was career offender with
sixteen criminal history points, which resulted in sentencing guideline range of
360 months to life imprisonment). Mackey argued for a departure from the guideline range, while the government recommended a life sentence. See id. After the
trial but prior to sentencing, Ragin sent a handwritten letter to the district court
claiming Mackey fell asleep twice during the trial. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 613. The
district court ultimately sentenced Ragin to thirty years in prison. See Ragin, 2014
WL 4105898, at *1.
97. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 613 (stating Fourth Circuit affirmed Ragin’s
sentence).
98. See id. at 613–14 (noting Ragin sought habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 and stating government opposed Ragin’s motion).
99. See id. at 614 (stating Ragin submitted sworn affidavit in conjunction with
§ 2255 motion, which elaborated on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
and noted that Mackey fell asleep twice during trial). Ragin claimed Mackey’s
sleeping indicated Mackey’s lack of interest in and dedication to the case. See id.
100. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *1–2. The evidentiary hearing took place
on May 12, 2014. See id. (noting court held evidentiary hearing open and stating
Mackey testified on June 2, 2014).
101. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 614 (stating Ragin called Peter Adolf, Richard
Culler, and Pamela Vernon as witnesses). The government called Mackey and Special Agent Terrell Tadeo to testify at the evidentiary hearing. See id.
102. See id. (noting Adolf testified he “definitely” saw Mackey sleeping on one
occasion but did not specifically recall any other situations where Mackey was
sleeping during trial).
103. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *3 (“Adolf stated that the Assistant
United States Attorney was showing defense counsel a document and Mackey did
not respond until the [c]ourt called out his name.”).
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Mackey’s name on the microphone.104 Adolf said Mackey “jumped” up,
looking confused, and reviewed the document before returning to his
“sleeping” position.105 Culler similarly testified that he noticed Mackey’s
head was down as if he were sleeping at one point during the trial.106
Both Adolf and Culler made clear that they were focused on their clients
and did not pay much attention to Mackey’s behavior.107
Next, Vernon testified that she noticed Mackey sleeping almost every
day throughout the trial.108 Specifically, Vernon said Mackey was asleep
while evidence was being presented and witnesses were being questioned.109 Based on the courtroom setup, Mackey was in the jurors’ direct
line of sight, and Vernon testified that the other jurors noticed Mackey’s
sleeping and discussed it during jury deliberations.110
Finally, Ragin testified on his own behalf, claiming he had to rouse
Mackey numerous times when Mackey failed to respond at trial.111 The
government then called two witnesses: Special Agent Terrell Tadeo and
Mackey.112 Tadeo testified that he observed Mackey potentially nodding
off on at least one—possibly two—occasions.113 Mackey did not recall
104. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 614 (retelling Adolf’s testimony and explaining
Mackey “jumped” when judge said his name loudly in microphone).
105. See id. (highlighting that Adolf did not recall who was testifying “or what
document the government was showing” when Mackey was sleeping).
106. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *3 (stating Richard Culler testified that
“he remembered one specific instance during the trial where Mackey had his head
down on his arms and appeared to be sleeping but breathing regularly”).
107. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 614–15 (noting Mackey was in neither Adolf’s nor
Culler’s direct line of sight and stating Culler did not pay much attention to
Mackey’s sleeping because witness on stand was speaking about Culler’s client).
108. See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *3 (retelling Vernon’s testimony).
109. See id. (stating Vernon observed “Mackey with his head in his hands
propped up on the table, not seeming alert”); see also Ragin, 820 F.3d at 615 (stating Vernon saw Mackey sleeping while evidence was being presented and witnesses
were being questioned).
110. See Ragin 820 F.3d at 615, 621 (“[I]t appears not only that the jurors
discussed their observations of Mackey ‘resting his head’ during jury deliberations
but also, even more troubling, that the jurors may have held Mackey’s conduct
against Ragin in reaching their verdict.”).
111. See id. at 615 (summarizing Ragin’s testimony). Vernon testified she noticed Ragin punch Mackey to rouse him when Mackey was called on during trial.
See id.
112. See id. at 615–16 (discussing Tadeo’s testimony). Tadeo was a witness at
Ragin’s jury trial, where he testified about “Ragin’s admissions to him about driving the prostitutes to their appointments, using firearms to defend the drug territory, and receiving $100 to beat up a woman.” See Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *2.
113. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 615–16 (restating Tadeo’s testimony and noting
Tadeo saw Mackey’s eyes closed and head down during trial); see also Ragin, 2014
WL 4105898, at *4 (“Special Agent Tadeo testified about one or two instances in
which Mackey briefly had his eyes closed, but was not outright sleeping. He could
not remember which day or during which witness that behavior occurred.”).
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whether he slept during the trial and dismissed the claims as political
fodder.114
After consideration of the testimony presented at the hearing, the district court found Ragin’s and Vernon’s statements not credible.115 As
such, the court concluded that Mackey was not asleep for a substantial
portion of the trial and denied Ragin’s motion.116 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and granted Ragin habeas
relief.117
B.

Ragin Court Hears the Alarm and Awakens Substantial Portion Rule
in Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by summarizing the Strickland
and Cronic decisions.118 First, the court classified Cronic-type errors as
structural.119 The court explained that structural errors affect the underlying reliability of a trial and therefore require automatic reversal without
any inquiry into counsel’s performance or the existence of prejudice.120
114. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 616 (noting Mackey was running for sheriff at time
of ineffective assistance of counsel allegations). Mackey stated “he would have
remembered” falling asleep at trial if it had happened, and he testified “that he
believed the [c]ourt would have admonished him had he been asleep and that the
record would reflect him sleeping.” Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *4 (stating
Mackey could not recall details because time had passed since trial).
115. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 616 (stating lower court found Vernon’s testimony
not credible because Vernon used Ragin’s first name while testifying and did not
bring sleeping to court’s attention); see also Ragin, 2014 WL 4105898, at *7 (finding
Ragin’s testimony not credible because Ragin had great incentive to embellish
claim). In finding Vernon’s testimony not credible, the district court stated
Vernon “repeatedly referred to Ragin by his first name during her testimony,
[and] may be remorseful for the severity of the sentence imposed.” See Ragin, 2014
WL 4105898, at *7.
116. See id. at *9 (“[T]he Court finds that Petitioner has not established any
prejudice from the alleged sleeping.”). The court applied the Strickland test and
concluded Ragin did not make a sufficient showing that Mackey’s behavior
prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. See id. at *7–8.
117. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 612 (reversing denial of habeas relief and remanding for further proceedings).
118. See id. at 617–18 (beginning discussion by explaining Strickland and
Cronic decisions). For an in-depth discussion of the Strickland and Cronic decisions,
see supra notes 41–59. Before the Ragin court began its analysis, it noted that it
would be reviewing de novo the district court’s legal conclusions and any mixed
questions of law and fact regarding Ragin’s Sixth Amendment claim. See Ragin,
820 F.3d at 617. The court also stated it would be reviewing the findings from
Ragin’s evidentiary hearing for clear error. See id.
119. See id. at 618 (stating Cronic errors are structural and defining structural
error as error that “‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds’ and
prevents the trial from ‘reliably serv[ing] its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence’” (alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991))).
120. See id. (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008)); see also
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984) (citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)) (stating certain circumstances require presumption of
prejudice without any inquiry into actual conduct of counsel).
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In contrast, a Strickland error results in reversal only when the defendant
shows that the outcome of the trial is unfair or unreliable due to counsel’s
performance.121
The court then went on to discuss the Strickland test in more detail.122
Because the performance prong of the Strickland test focuses on the acts or
omissions of counsel, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the test necessarily assumes counsel is present and able to render assistance and exercise
judgment at trial.123 Under Strickland, courts must determine whether
counsel provided “professionally competent assistance” given the range of
strategies and tactics available to him or her.124
When counsel sleeps through trial, the issue shifts focus.125 Courts
are no longer deciding whether an attorney failed to employ a particular
trial initiative; instead, courts are determining whether the courtroom
slumber amounted to a constructive denial of counsel.126 Using this
framework, the Fourth Circuit concluded an attorney who sleeps through
a substantial portion of trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and triggers a presumption of prejudice under Cronic.127
121. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“Unless a defendant makes both showings [under the two-pronged test], it cannot be said that the
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the
result unreliable.”).
122. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 617–18 (discussing Strickland).
123. See id. at 620 (“‘[T]he buried assumption in our Strickland cases is that
counsel is present and conscious to exercise judgment, calculation and instinct, for
better or worse.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682,
687 (2d Cir. 1996))).
124. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (explaining courts ruling on ineffective
assistance of counsel claims must determine whether counsel’s acts or omissions
were reasonable in light of circumstances).
125. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 620 (noting Ragin’s claim of prejudice was not
“that his lawyer failed to take any particular initiative at trial” but rather that his
counsel was absent during substantial portion of trial); see also Tippins, 77 F.3d at
687 (“[W]e understand Tippins’ claim of prejudice to be not that his lawyer
should have taken any particular initiative that would potentially affect the result,
but that, at critical times, Tippins had no counsel to sort out what initiatives were
open.”). The Ragin and Tippins courts recognized that “[t]he situation where
counsel is asleep . . . is more analogous to the situation where a defendant is without counsel than where a defendant claims that counsel acted improperly.”
Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 466; see also Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349
(5th Cir. 2001) (“Unconscious counsel equates to no counsel at all. Unconscious
counsel does not analyze, object, listen or in any way exercise judgment on behalf
of a client.”).
126. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (stating there is legal presumption of
prejudice when defendant is actually or constructively denied counsel); see also
Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating defendant is
prejudiced as matter of law when defendant “is tried in the . . . absence of
counsel”).
127. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 619 (articulating “substantial portion” rule); see also
Javor, 724 F.2d at 834 (holding attorney who sleeps through substantial portion of
defendant’s trial does not provide defendant with legal assistance guaranteed by
Sixth Amendment).
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The Fourth Circuit then proceeded to apply this rule to the facts of
Ragin’s case and found that the district court erred when it concluded that
Mackey was not asleep for a substantial portion of trial.128 First, the court
reasoned that every witness—including the government’s witness—said
the same thing at the evidentiary hearing: Mackey was asleep, or appeared
to be sleeping, at some point during the eighteen-day trial.129 The Fourth
Circuit noted that Adolf observed Mackey sleeping once, and Culler,
Ragin, and Tadeo saw Mackey nodding off on one or two occasions
throughout the trial.130 Recognizing that each witness could have observed Mackey sleeping on different occasions, the court identified seven
potential instances of courtroom slumber.131
Next, the Fourth Circuit determined it was clear error for the district
court to dismiss Vernon’s testimony.132 As a juror in the case, Vernon sat
directly across from Mackey during the eighteen-day trial.133 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that Vernon was in the best position to observe Mackey’s
conduct and assess the frequency of his sleeping based on this courtroom
setup.134
As such, the Fourth Circuit gave great deference to Vernon’s testimony that Mackey was asleep almost every day of the two-week trial for at
least thirty minutes.135 The court noted that nothing in the record contra128. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 620 (finding mistake had been committed in district court’s finding of facts and reversing district court’s decision). The district
court found Mackey was not asleep for substantial portions of trial. See Ragin v.
United States, No. 3:10-cv-488-RJC, 2014 WL 4105898, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19,
2014), vacated, Ragin, 820 F.3d at 624.
129. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 621 (recognizing every witness testified that
Mackey was asleep during trial “[b]esides Mackey, who, tellingly, could not recall
whether he was asleep at trial”).
130. See id. at 621–22 n.9 (noting number of times each witness observed
Mackey’s sleeping).
131. See id. at 621–22 (“[T]he district court utterly failed to consider the likely
possibility that each witness saw Mackey asleep or nodding off on different occasions.
Had the court done so, it would have reached the conclusion that Mackey could
have been asleep on at least six or seven different occasions.”); see also id. (noting
possibility that Mackey slept at least six or seven different times throughout trial
was “consistent with Vernon’s testimony” that Mackey was sleeping almost every
day).
132. See id. at 621 (finding “nothing in the record to suggest that Vernon had
knowledge of the sentence the district court imposed, that she felt remorseful, or
that she had improper communications or any interactions with Ragin”). For a
discussion of why the district court dismissed Vernon’s testimony, see supra note
115 and accompanying text.
133. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 (explaining courtroom setup and noting
Vernon sat directly across from Mackey).
134. See id. (“Every other witness at the evidentiary hearing stated that Mackey
was not directly in their line of sight and that their attention was directed at the
witness box, which was located at the opposite side of the courtroom from where
Mackey sat.”).
135. See id. (“Common sense dictates that a juror who is seated directly across
from counsel can observe counsel asleep more often during a two-week trial than a
person who does not have a direct line of sight to counsel and whose attention is
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dicted or discredited this testimony.136 All of the witnesses, even the government’s witness, testified that Mackey was asleep on one or two
occasions during the trial.137 The Fourth Circuit found it “impossible”
not to conclude that Mackey slept during a substantial portion of Ragin’s
trial.138 Therefore, the court held that Ragin suffered prejudice under
Cronic.139
The court concluded by comparing the facts of Ragin’s case to other
sleeping lawyer cases, in particular Javor and Burdine.140 The court found
the facts of Ragin’s case to be “equally—if not more—egregious than the
facts” of those cases.141 In Javor, the attorney only “dozed off momentarily,” and in Burdine, three witnesses, including a juror, testified that they
had not noticed counsel sleeping during the trial.142 However, in Ragin’s
case, Mackey slept for at least thirty minutes every day of the trial, and every
witness stated that they observed Mackey sleeping “on at least one occasion.”143 The Fourth Circuit found this to be an extraordinary case of
admittedly directed to the opposite side of the courtroom from where counsel
sat.”).
136. See id. (stating government did not dispute Vernon’s testimony even
though it had opportunity to do so).
137. See id. at 615 (stating government witness “Tadeo testified that he saw
Mackey ‘nod off’ on at least one . . . occasion[ ]” during trial). Contra Ragin v.
United States, No. 3:10-cv-488-RJC, 2014 WL 4105898, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19,
2014) (noting Tadeo testified that Mackey was alert and aggressive during Tadeo’s
testimony and cross-examination and explaining that Tadeo testified “about one
or two instances in which Mackey briefly had his eyes closed, but was not outright
sleeping”).
138. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 (“Based on this record, we find it impossible
not to conclude that Mackey slept, and was therefore not functioning as a lawyer
during a substantial portion of the trial.”).
139. See id. at 621 n.6 (choosing not to undertake Strickland analysis “because
prejudice in this case [was] presumed under Cronic”).
140. See id. at 623 (discussing Burdine and Javor); see also generally Burdine v.
Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling on sleeping lawyer issue where counsel slept repeatedly throughout trial); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.
1984) (ruling on sleeping lawyer issue where counsel slept, dozed, and was not
alert to proceedings during defendant’s trial). For a further discussion of Javor,
see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Burdine,
see supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
141. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 623 (stating facts of Ragin’s case were “equally—if
not more—egregious than the facts presented in cases where other circuits have
presumed prejudice”). The Fourth Circuit highlighted the fact that none of the
evidence was in dispute, and “[t]here were no witnesses that testified that Mackey
was not asleep—not even Mackey.” See id.
142. See id. (distinguishing Ragin’s case from Burdine and Javor); see also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 339 (stating some witnesses did not notice Burdine’s counsel
asleep during trial); Javor, 724 F.2d at 836 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The magistrate noted that the trial judge observed the sleeping attorney, but did not call a
recess because the attorney would only doze off momentarily and then wake up.”).
143. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 623 (“[A]s discussed extensively above, every witness stated that they observed Mackey asleep on at least one occasion, with multiple
witnesses testifying that Mackey was asleep on multiple occasions.”).
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ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated Ragin’s conviction and
sentence.144
IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS: DREAMING OF A CLEARER RULE
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Because the word substantial is susceptible to multiple interpretations, courts ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel claims in sleeping
lawyer cases have found the substantial portion rule to be a vague and
unhelpful standard by which to evaluate prejudice.145 In Ragin, the court
“decline[d] to dictate precise parameters” regarding substantial sleep and
instead offered three potential meanings of the word substantial—length,
proportion, or significance.146 Its own analysis, however, placed significant weight on the duration and frequency of Mackey’s sleeping.147
Therefore, it seems likely that lower courts looking to Ragin for guidance
will adopt a quantitative interpretation of the word substantial.148
A quantitative rule, however, is an inadequate standard by which to
assess prejudice in sleeping lawyer cases.149 Such a rule contravenes Cronic
because it could result in the reversal of a case in which an attorney sleeps
144. See id. at 623–24 (classifying facts as “extraordinary and egregious,” vacating, and remanding case for further proceedings).
145. See Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding word
“substantial” unhelpful because it has multiple meanings and can refer to length of
time, proportion of proceeding, or significance of proceeding); see also Burdine,
262 F.3d at 362–63 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (explaining word “substantial” could
refer to length of sleep, significance of evidence presented, or impact on defense
and noting word “‘substantial’ has many uses in the legal context” (citing numerous definitions incorporating word “substantial” in Black’s Law Dictionary)).
146. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11 (explaining word substantial). The court
stated:
Whether a lawyer slept for a substantial portion of the trial should be
determined on a case-by-case basis, considering, but not limited to, the
length of time counsel slept, the proportion of the trial missed, and the
significance of the portion counsel slept through. At the same time, however, while we decline to dictate precise parameters for what must necessarily be a case-by-case assessment, we caution district courts that the
scope of our holding today should not be limited to only the most egregious instances of attorney slumber.
Id.
147. See id. at 623 (basing decision on fact that Mackey was asleep on multiple
occasions for at least thirty minutes).
148. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (suggesting lower
courts will look to majority decision for guidance, so court cannot expressly limit
rule to facts before it). The dissent criticized the majority for failing to give “guidance to federal habeas courts, which may well in the future consider similar
claims.” See id.
149. See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 686 (explaining prolonged periods of sleep “may
be quantitatively substantial” yet have no effect on trial). The Tippins court recognized that there are certain periods of trial where “even alert and resourceful
counsel cannot affect the proceedings to a client’s advantage.” See id.
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for a long, yet inconsequential, portion of trial.150 A more precise standard would find prejudice when an attorney sleeps during a “critical portion[ ] of the trial.”151 Because the Supreme Court has already
characterized certain stages of trial as critical, this rule would be easier for
lower courts to implement.152
A.

Courts Should Put the Substantial Shut-Eye Rule to Bed

The Oxford Dictionary defines the word substantial as “of considerable importance, size, or worth.”153 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary states
substantial means “large in amount, size, or number.”154 These are just
two of the likely hundreds of definitions for the word substantial, but the
point is clear: “substantial” is susceptible to many interpretations.155
In Ragin, the court expressly declined to adopt a particular definition
of the word.156 Instead, the court noted that the word substantial could
refer to “the length of time counsel slept, the proportion of trial missed,
and the significance of the portion counsel slept through.”157 The Fourth
Circuit’s failure to provide a clear meaning of the word substantial could
lead to considerable confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts.158
Courts could easily adopt any one of the three definitions outlined in the
150. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (stating courts may
presume prejudice when counsel is absent during critical stage of trial); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“An error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”); Burdine, 262
F.3d at 382 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (noting it was impossible to glean from record which portions of trial through which counsel slept).
151. See Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 469 (concluding prejudice should be
presumed in three distinct circumstances, one of which is when counsel sleeps
during “critical portions of the trial”).
152. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 355 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (classifying
presentation of guilt and taking of evidence as critical stages of trial). For a further
discussion of critical stages of trial, see infra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
153. See Substantial, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, supra note 21.
154. See Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 21.
155. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 362 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (stating majority
did not define word “insubstantial” and explaining word could refer to length of
sleep or “significance of the evidence being presented while counsel slept and its
impact on the defense” (citing Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir.
1996))).
156. See United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 622 n.11 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining “to dictate precise parameters for what must necessarily be a case-by-case
assessment”).
157. See id. (discussing factors involved in defining substantial).
158. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (arguing majority
views substantiality as continuum “in which there is some middle ground which is
neither ‘substantial’ nor ‘insubstantial’” and stating majority gave no guidance to
lower courts regarding how to determine substantiality of sleeping).
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Ragin decision; depending on which interpretation courts embrace, they
may reach different results on identical facts.159
It seems likely that lower courts looking to Ragin for guidance will
adopt a quantitative rule.160 Although the Ragin court provided three definitions of the word substantial, its own analysis placed significant weight
on the duration and frequency of Mackey’s sleeping.161 A quantitative
rule, however, is an inadequate standard by which to assess prejudice in
sleeping lawyer cases.162 First, a quantitative rule necessarily requires a
benchmark prejudicial quantity of sleep.163 In Ragin, the Fourth Circuit
did not indicate how many minutes of courtroom slumber would trigger a
reversal under Cronic.164 While thirty minutes of sleeping every day of trial
was presumptively prejudicial in Ragin, it is unclear how many minutes of
slumber would constitute a substantial portion of trial in future cases.165
Second, a rule that focuses on the length of sleep could lead to reversal in cases where an attorney sleeps for a long time but during inconsequential stages of trial.166 Although “the notion of a sleeping lawyer is
159. See Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 859–60 (stating “district courts could
eventually come to different conclusions depending on which [version of sleeping
lawyer standard] they use”).
160. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (suggesting lower
courts will look to majority’s decision for guidance).
161. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 623 (emphasizing Mackey was asleep almost every
day for at least thirty minutes).
162. See Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 469 (“It is difficult for a defendant to
pinpoint evidence of exactly how much overall time counsel slept or of exactly
when counsel was sleeping. Unless someone is closely observing counsel during
the trial, it will not be easy to pinpoint this information, except perhaps in the
more extreme cases.”); see also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting)
(“[H]ow many minutes of sleeping, or how many nods or head bobs will trigger
presumed-prejudice?”).
163. See Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 860 (stating sleeping lawyer standards
need to “address the amount of sleep necessary to meet the threshold for presuming prejudice”). Van Arsdel poses an important question: “Who should be timekeeper” with a test that reduces the prejudice question to actual minutes? See id. at
862 (explaining evidentiary hearings in sleeping lawyer cases rely “on witnesses
noticing counsel’s sleeping, remembering what they saw, and being able to identify
the amount of time and stage of the trial during which counsel was asleep”); see
also Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (finding majority rule imposes obligation on judges and prosecutors “to closely and unceasingly monitor
defense counsel throughout trial to ensure defense counsel is awake”). But see
Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 469 (proposing test that would presume prejudice
when “counsel sleeps [ten] minutes of a one-hour trial, [and] where counsel sleeps
several different times over a 30-day trial”).
164. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11 (concluding thirty minutes of sleep was
substantial and noting substantiality must be assessed on case-by-case basis).
165. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (stating sleeping
lawyer standards “must be shaped so that [they] can be applied—as [they] may
well be—in future cases” and concluding majority’s rule “will result in uncertainty
and undermine accuracy”).
166. See id. at 338 (majority opinion) (affirming district court decision, which
presumed prejudice and granted habeas relief). But see id. at 382 (Barksdale, J.,
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abhorrent,” under Cronic, an attorney’s sleeping is not presumptively prejudicial if it does not occur at a critical time.167
In Ragin, the Fourth Circuit’s decision hinged on the fact that Mackey
snoozed for at least thirty minutes every day of trial; the court vacated
Ragin’s conviction and sentence without any inquiry into when Mackey
slept.168 The court even noted that its holding did not bar a claim based
on counsel sleeping during a critical portion of a defendant’s trial because
Ragin did not plead facts that would implicate such a rule.169
By failing to consider when Mackey slept or what Mackey missed while
he was unconscious, the Fourth Circuit ignored the plain language of
Cronic.170 Cronic presumes prejudice only if counsel’s absence occurs at a
critical time; “[n]ot even a substantial absence satisfies Cronic unless it occurs during key moments of the trial.”171 Had the court considered what
Mackey missed while he was unconscious, it may have found that Mackey
slept only during periods concerned with Ragin’s co-defendants or uncontested issues.172
dissenting) (finding it impossible to glean from record which portions of trial
counsel slept through).
167. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 21, at 829–30 (noting public is
conditioned to think of criminal procedure as “equal battle between dueling sides”
but stating there is “disconnection between the public perception of the meaning
of effective assistance and the legal definition outlined in Strickland” and Cronic
decisions). Cunningham-Parmeter states:
The outcry from the sleeping lawyer cases demonstrates the disconnection between the public perception of the meaning of effective assistance
and the legal definition outlined in Strickland, which has been so restrained by technicalities since its inception that even the performance of
some somnolent lawyers has satisfied its characterization of competency.
Id. at 830.
168. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 623 (stating Mackey was asleep on multiple occasions without discussing when Mackey was asleep). But see Ragin v. United States,
No. 3:10-cv-488-RJC, 2014 WL 4105898, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2014) (noting
transcript shows Mackey was attentive to six witnesses that directly testified about
Ragin’s involvement with conspiracy), vacated, Ragin, 820 F.3d at 624.
169. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 619 n.3 (“Our holding today does not preclude a
claim in which counsel is asleep during a critical portion of the defendant’s trial.
Ragin, however, has not pled facts that would implicate such a rule.” (citation
omitted)).
170. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (concluding trial is
unfair when counsel is absent during critical stage of trial).
171. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 21, at 878 (highlighting that
courts can presume prejudice only when counsel’s absence occurs at critical time).
But see Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (noting courts may presume prejudice when there is
complete denial of counsel at critical stage or when “counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”). See also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
345–50 (1980)) (“[P]rejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual
conflict of interest.”).
172. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 614 (explaining Adolf and Culler saw Mackey
sleeping at time when witnesses were mostly talking about their clients); see also
Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J., dissenting)
(noting circumstances of case do not justify presumed prejudice because “it is im-
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Lawyers, Don’t Close Your Eyes, Don’t Fall Asleep, Because You’d Miss a
Critical Portion of Trial, and You Don’t Want to Miss a Thing

Currently, all of the circuits that have addressed the sleeping lawyer
issue have developed standards that focus, in one way or another, on the
duration or frequency of attorney slumber.173 Although sleeping for a
prolonged period of time during a defendant’s criminal trial may be considered poor lawyering, it is not presumptively prejudicial under Cronic
unless the sleeping occurred at a critical time.174 Therefore, courts
should abandon the substantial portion standard and simply presume
prejudice when counsel sleeps through a critical portion of trial.175
The critical portion rule would provide lower courts with a clearer
rule by which to assess ineffectiveness claims in sleeping lawyer cases.176
Unlike the substantial portion rule, which is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the Supreme Court has delineated exactly which portions of
trial are critical.177 In general, a stage is critical if “the substantial rights of
possible to determine whether . . . [counsel] slept during the presentation of crucial, inculpatory evidence, or during the introduction of unobjectionable,
uncontested evidence”). But see Ragin, 820 F.3d at 621 n.5 (“Even assuming, arguendo, that Mackey only slept during the portion of trial in which no witness testimony directly implicated Ragin, ‘[t]he adversary process becomes unreliable when
no attorney is present to keep the taint of conspiracy from spreading to the client.’” (quoting United States v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 2000))).
173. See, e.g., Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11 (explaining word substantial could
refer to length of time); Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2011)
(analyzing duration of counsel’s sleeping); Burdine, 262 F.3d at 362 (Barksdale, J.,
dissenting) (noting substantial could refer to length of time or significance of evidence being presented when counsel slept and because record made it impossible
to determine when counsel slept “the majority . . . chose[ ] the former—length of
sleep-time”).
174. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (“The presumption that counsel’s assistance is
essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” (emphasis added)). In a footnote, the Court explained that it “has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of
prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” Id. at 659 n.25 (citing exemplary cases); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[T]he purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation . . . . The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial.”). In Strickland, the Court noted that “[a]ttorney errors come in
an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they
are to be prejudicial.” Id. at 693.
175. See Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 467 (concluding prejudice should be
presumed “when defense counsel sleeps during [critical portions of] trial”).
176. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 363 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (noting substantial
or insubstantial rule “gives no guidance to federal habeas courts, which may well in
the future consider similar claims”).
177. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (stating counsel must be
present at every critical stage of trial “where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected”); see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973) and United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1967)) (suggesting proceeding is critical when accused is confronted by expert adversary or legal procedural system and results of confrontation
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a defendant may be affected” during that time.178 Critical stages include
the introduction of incriminating evidence, the presentation of key testimony, and the confrontation of the defendant by “the legal procedural
system or the expertise of a [government] adversary.”179 Under the critical portion rule, so long as the attorney is awake and performing during
these proceedings, the trial is fair and reliable, even if the attorney sleeps
for a prolonged period of trial.180
If, however, courts wanted to maintain a quantitative element in their
sleeping lawyer standards, they could follow the lead of the Sixth Circuit.181 The Tippins rule, which presumes prejudice if counsel is “repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which defendant’s interests
were at stake,” requires courts to focus not only on the length and frequency of sleeping, but also on when the sleeping occurred.182 Of all the
sleeping lawyer standards, the Tippins rule best captures the underlying
principles of Strickland and Cronic.183
V.

CONCLUSION: RAGIN DECISION SERVES AS WAKE-UP CALL
FOR THE SUPREME COURT

If individuals are going to practice law, they need to be prepared for
the day-to-day stresses and challenges of being a lawyer: strict deadlines,
heavy caseloads, long hours, and sleep deprivation.184 Practicing law can
be an exhausting marathon, and, given the ever-increasing demands of
might settle accused’s fate); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858–59 (1975)
(finding closing argument constituted critical stage of trial).
178. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 347 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1991)).
179. See id. (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)); see also
id. at 355 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (finding presentation of evidence of
guilt to be part of critical stage of trial); id. at 394 (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (citing
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)) (finding presumption of prejudice when
defendant was denied counsel during cross-examination).
180. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (“When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted—even if defense counsel may have
made demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred.” (footnote omitted)).
181. For a discussion of the Tippins decision, see supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
182. See Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 854 n.175 (“Tippins suffered prejudice,
by presumption or otherwise, if his counsel was repeatedly unconscious at trial for
periods of time in which defendant’s interests were at stake.” (citing Tippins v.
Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996))); see also id. at 859 (differentiating between Javor and Tippins tests and noting that “the former only requires an amount
of time while the latter also requires the defendant’s interests to be at stake”).
183. See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 690 (analyzing whether counsel “was functioning
as a lawyer during critical times at trial”). For a further discussion of the Strickland
and Cronic decisions, see supra notes 41–59 and accompanying text.
184. See Carter, supra note 8 (stating “[s]ome aspect of legal culture encourages overwork” and discussing American Bar Foundation study that found average
lawyer works at least fifty hours per week); see also Rampell, supra note 6 (describing study that found law second most sleep-deprived profession).
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the legal industry, it is likely courts will face sleeping lawyer cases well into
the future.185 Future courts need a clear rule to apply.186
Currently, there are three different standards for assessing prejudice
in sleeping lawyer cases, and “what may be enough sleep at the right time
to constitute presumed prejudice for one court may not be adequate
proof for another court.”187 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ragin only
adds to this confusion.188 Ideally, the Ragin decision will serve as a wakeup call to the Supreme Court: it is time to grant certiorari to a future
sleeping lawyer case and issue a uniform standard by which to assess
prejudice in sleeping lawyer cases.189 Until then, lawyers need to wake up
in the courtroom and smell the coffee—and maybe drink some, too.190
185. See United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 619 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating case
was issue of first impression in Fourth Circuit but noting “four other circuits have
considered whether application of a presumption of prejudice under Cronic is warranted when a defendant’s counsel is asleep during trial” (emphasis added)). But
see Kirchmeier, supra note 28, at 469 (“[T]he situation of sleeping counsel is, hopefully, rare. There are not many published cases involving sleeping counsel.”).
186. See Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 838 (arguing for more specific standard
in sleeping attorney cases).
187. See id. at 856 (describing different standards in sleeping lawyer cases); see
also Ragin, 820 F.3d at 612 (“We hold that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of
the defendant’s trial.”); Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2011) (ruling on sleeping lawyer issue and concluding there is no Sixth Amendment violation unless attorney sleeps for substantial portion of time); Burdine v. Johnson,
262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling Sixth Amendment violation occurs when
“counsel is repeatedly unconscious through not insubstantial portions
of . . . trial”); Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687, 689 (concluding defendant suffers prejudice
when counsel is repeatedly unconscious at trial when “defendant’s interests [are]
at stake”); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding attorney that sleeps through substantial portion of defendant’s trial does not provide
defendant with legal assistance guaranteed by Sixth Amendment).
188. See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11 (declining to define term substantial for
all cases); see also Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 854 (stating variety of rules is “reminiscent of pre-Strickland case law,” where each circuit had its own standard for assessing prejudice).
189. See Van Arsdel, supra, at 860 (arguing standard for assessing prejudice
needs to be more specific). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89
(1984) (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”).
Currently, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to a sleeping lawyer case. See e.g., Van Arsdel, supra note 11, at 837 (stating Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Burdine case). However, if the Court does hear a sleeping
lawyer case, “[n]o matter what standard [the Court] adopts, another question
presents itself—who, if anyone, is keeping track of the sleep necessary to find presumed prejudice?” See id. at 865, 867 (arguing courts should place video cameras
in courtroom and explaining cameras “would record the proceedings [and act] as
a video supplement to the audio trial record” (citing Winton Woods, Firms Take
Courtrooms to the Next Level, 37 ARIZ. ATT’Y 46, 46–47 (2001))).
190. See generally Almendrala, supra note 5 (discussing sleep deprivation in
America).
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